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Abstract
The structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asym-
metry across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty are estimated with a
sample of French Treasury auctions. We ﬁnd evidence of both informational
and risk aversion asymmetries between bidders. A counter-factual analysis
also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift
from the discriminatory to the uniform-price format would simultaneously
beneﬁt the French Treasury and the auctions’ participants.
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Since the early 1960s, economists have debated the most appropriate auction
mechanism to sell Treasury securities. As we shall see, the various theoretic models
proposed, and the numerous empirical analysis conducted, have not produced an
unambiguous conclusion. In fact, two recent papers by Wang and Zender (2002),
and Ausubel and Cramton (2002), suggest that a theoretical ranking of auction
formats may be impossible in general. The authors actually conclude that the
superiority of an auction mechanism may only be determined empirically on a
case-by-case basis. Moreover, economic analyses of Treasury auctions are typically
based on the empirically questionable assumption that participants are symmetric
with respect to resources, information available, and aversion to risk. The object
of the present paper is to estimate a structural model with a sample of French
Treasury auctions to test whether participants are symmetric, and to determine
which auction format is preferable in this context.
At a Treasury auction, a speciﬁc type of security is sold to several accredited
ﬁnancial institutions. The bidders submit simultaneously a sealed bid consisting
of a demand schedule. A bid therefore speciﬁes the number of units of the security
requested at each possible price. The market-clearing price, also known as the
stop-out-price, matches aggregate demand with the available supply of security.
Two basic formats are typically considered: at discriminatory auctions, the most
frequently used, the highest bids are ﬁlled at the bided price until supply is ex-
hausted; at uniform-price auctions, bidders pay the stop-out-price for all units
they requested at prices exceeding the stop-out-price.
Beginning with Wilson (1979), Treasury auctions have been typically modelled
as common-value auctions in which symmetric bidders compete for a share of the
quantity supplied.1 In practice, however, a broad range of ﬁnancial institutions
participate in Treasury auctions, and the symmetry assumption may be ques-
tioned. In France, for instance, a small group a large banks submits most bids,
and controls roughly 60% of the securities allocated.2 As we shall see, ignoring
1Anton and Yao (1992), as well as Hortaçsu (2002a), are exceptions as they consider that
treasury auctions have essentially a private-values component, and that bidders submit discrete
demand functions.
2This type of asymmetries are not speciﬁc to the French Treasury auctions. For instance,
Hortaçsu (2002a) ﬁnds that 20 (50) out of 134 participants entered 20 (less than 10) out of the
27 Turkish Treasury auctions in his sample. In addition, Hortaçsu notes that “the top 5 bidders
capture 30% evenly, and the top 15 capture about 70% of the issues.” Comparable asymmetries
have been observed in Treasury auctions over the world (e.g. Umlauf 1993 in Mexico, Malvey
2the presence of asymmetries across participants may have serious consequences
on optimal bidding behavior, and it may also aﬀect the ranking of the auction
formats in terms of the revenue generated by the Treasury. Indeed, our theoretic
model suggest that risk averse, and/or less-informed bidders become relatively
more aggressive at uniform-price auctions, since they do not have to pay their
bid. This, in turns, aﬀects the allocation of the security among the diﬀerent types
of bidders, as well as the revenue raised by the Treasury. Our results, however,
conﬁrm that the superiority of an auction format cannot be established in gen-
eral in this asymmetric environment, as it depends on the structural parameters
underlying the model. In other words, as suggested by Ausubel and Cramton
(2002), the choice between the uniform-price and discriminatory auction formats
in the presence of asymmetric bidders remains essentially an empirical question,
that we need to address econometrically in the speciﬁc case of the French Treasury
auctions.
Our ﬁrst objective is to develop a structural model to test whether the par-
ticipants in the French Treasury auctions i) have access to diﬀerent sources of
information regarding the value of the security for sale, and ii) have diﬀerent
levels of risk aversion. To do so, we generalize the common-value share auction
model of Wang and Zender (2002), in which the quantity for sale is not perfectly
known at the time of the auction (possibly as the result of non-competitive bids),
to account for informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders.3 This
generalized model cannot be solved analytically, and we have to rely on numerical
techniques to approximate the untractable Bayesian Nash equilibrium (hereafter
BNE). The structural parameters underlying our Treasury auction model are then
estimated using an original application of the method of simulated moments to
the estimation of games of incomplete information. This method enables in par-
ticular to take advantage of all the information available in the sample. The
estimated parameters suggest that the participants in French Treasury auctions
may be divided in two distinct groups. One group consisting mostly of smaller ﬁ-
nancial institutions, characterized by a higher level of risk aversion, and receiving
and Archibald 1998 in the US, and Bjonnes 2001 in Norway).
3Non-competitive bids consist only in a (limited) quantity demanded by accredited ﬁnan-
cial institutions that will be ﬁlled systematically by the auctioneer. The price paid by non-
competitive bidders is the same, but it is unknown at the time they submit their bids. Depend-
ing upon the auction rule, the price is either equal to the stop-out-price, or a function of the
prices paid by the competitive bidders in the subsequent auction. The quantities demanded by
non-competitive bidders are only revealed after the auction. As a result, competitive bidders do
not known at the time of the auction, the remaining quantity that will be supplied to them.
3signiﬁcantly noisier signals about the true value of the security.
Finally, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to compare the discriminatory
and uniform-price formats. We ﬁnd that, in the context of the French Treasury
auctions, the uniform-price format would simultaneously increase (on average)
the revenue of the Treasury, and the utility of both types of participants. This
result may be explained by the combination of two factors. First, the uniform-
price auction signiﬁcantly reduces the variance of the bidders proﬁts. As a result,
the expected utility of the participants (who are risk averse) increases under the
uniform pricing rule, even though the expected proﬁts of some bidders may slightly
diminish. Second, as small bidders become more aggressive, the average price
paid by a bidder (regardless of type) for a unit of the security increases under the
uniform-price format. Consequently, the total revenue of the Treasury rises on
average compared to the discriminatory format.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2, we summarize the literature
relevant to the present paper; the share auction model accounting for asymmetry
between participants and supply uncertainty is presented in section 3; the general
technique to approximate untractable Bayesian Nash Equilibria is introduced in
section 4, and it is applied to the share auction model in section 5; section 6
brieﬂy describes the market for the French Treasury securities, as well as our
sample of data; in section 7 we complete the speciﬁcation of the structural share
auction model; the econometric estimation technique is outlined in section 8; the
results of the structural estimation of the French Treasury auctions are analyzed
in section 9; section 10 compares the discriminatory and uniform-price auction
formats; ﬁnally, section 11 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Beginning with Friedman (1960), the choice between the uniform-price and dis-
criminatory auction formats has been often debated among economists.4 Uniform-
price auctions were initially presented as the revenue maximizing mechanism to
sell Treasury securities. The argument oﬀered was that discriminatory auctions
reduce competition by discouraging less informed bidders from participating, and
therefore facilitate collusion.5 These contentions were later on disputed on the ba-
4For surveys of the literature on Treasury auctions, see Bikchandani and Huang (1993), Das
and Sundaram (1996), Nandi (1997), or Klemperer (2000).
5Note that these early arguments were rather informal since the strategic nature of the
Treasury auctions was typically ignored.
4sis of comparisons with single-unit auction models. However, building on the share
auction model of Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993) demonstrated that con-
clusions drawn from single-unit auctions cannot be systematically extended to the
multi-unit case. In particular, Back and Zender found that uniform-price auctions
may have a continuum of undesirable collusive equilibrium, some of which yield-
ing arbitrarily low revenue to the seller. More recently, Wang and Zender (2002)
extended the share auction model to account for risk aversion, and random supply
generated by the presence of non-competitive bids. Wang and Zender demonstrate
that the presence of random supply drastically reduces the set of implausible equi-
libria.6 In fact, they show in an example that the uniform-price equilibrium is
unique when supply is random. More importantly, Wang and Zender ﬁnd that
it is in general impossible to compare the uniform and discriminatory pricing
rules in terms of the revenue raised by the Treasury. Adopting a slightly diﬀerent
approach, Ausubel and Cramton (2002) ﬁnd as well that the theory does not en-
able to rank unambiguously the two auction formats. In fact, they conclude that
“determining the better pricing rule is necessarily an empirical question.” The
superiority of an auction format, in the context of the French Treasury, therefore
depends on speciﬁc empirical factors, such as the bidders’ individual valuation of
the Treasury securities, and/or their level of risk aversion.
From an empirical perspective, two approaches should be distinguished: the
reduced-form and the structural approach. The reduced-form approach has been
the most frequently applied to rank auction formats in terms of revenue. After the
1992 Salomon scandal, the US Treasury shifted momentarily from the discrimi-
natory to the uniform-price format to sell some of its securities.7 This natural
experiment prompted a series of reduced-form analysis to evaluate the conse-
quences of such a decision. For instance, Simon (1994) estimated that the US
government lost large amounts of money by modifying the auction format, while
Mester (1995), Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996), as well as Malvey and Archibald
(1998) found that the uniform-price auction had a positive, but often insigniﬁ-
cant eﬀect on the Treasury revenue. Other reduced-form analyses conducted after
natural experiments in diﬀerent countries (e.g., Umlauf 1993 in Mexico, Tenorio
1993 in Zambia, or Berg, Boukai and Landsberger 1999 in Norway), seem to give
a slight edge to the uniform-price format. However, conclusions from the reduced
form approach are often considered too inconsistent to contribute unambiguously
6A similar argument has been advanced by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) who found that
demand uncertainty in procurement auctions reduces the set of equilibria to a singleton.
7See Jegadeesh (1993) for details.
5to the debate pertaining to the choice of Treasury auction mechanism. In fact, the
results in Malvey and Archibald (1998) suggest that reduced-form analysis follow-
ing natural experiments may not be the most appropriate approach to assess the
superiority of an auction format. Indeed, the authors note that after shifting to
the uniform pricing rule, the auctions’ outcomes became much more volatile from
one auction to the next. Because of this added noise, a reduced-form analysis may
not be able to identify the revenue diﬀerences between auction formats, especially
if these diﬀerences are small.
The second empirical approach has been adopted only recently, following the
developments in the estimation of structural models of incomplete information.8
This approach appears most promising to address the question of auction format
in speciﬁc contexts, such as the French Treasury auctions, in which no natural
experiment has been conducted. Hortaçsu (2002a) adopts such a structural ap-
proach to estimate non-parametrically a symmetric private-values model, in which
the quantities demanded belong to a ﬁnite grid. Considering a sample from the
Turkish Treasury auctions, the author ﬁnds that the discriminatory format yields
higher revenues than the uniform-price mechanism would. Fevrier, Preguet and
Visser (2002) estimate with a relatively small sample from the French Treasury
the share auction model originally proposed by Wilson (1979). They ﬁnd that
the uniform-price format would have lowered by 8% (on average) the Treasury’s
revenue. Finally, Castellanos and Oviedo (2002) applies the structural approach
developed by Fevrier et al. (2002) to a sample of Mexican Treasury auctions.
In contrast with the previous studies, Castellanos and Oviedo ﬁnd that a uni-
form price auction would increase the Mexican Treasury’s revenue by 1.44%. The
authors explain this result by a higher estimated variation in the Mexican par-
ticipants signals about the true value of the security. However, the pertinence of
the structural approach may be questioned as it relies on simplifying, but often
empirically questionable assumptions (e.g., symmetry and/or risk neutrality), in
order to solve the theoretic model analytically, or to enable the application of an
econometric estimator.
The present paper, although based on the structural approach, diﬀers in sev-
eral aspects from the three previously mentioned analyses. First, unlike Hortaçsu
(2002a), we consider a common-value model with continuous bid functions. Both
8See e.g., Paarsch (1992), Donald and Paarsch (1993,1996), Laﬀont, Ossard and Vuong
(1995), Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), as well as Florens, Protopopescu and Richard
(2002).
6assumptions are generally considered reasonable to describe Treasury auctions.9
Second, our model accounts for risk aversion and demand uncertainty. As we
shall see, these elements better describe the French Treasury auctions, they elim-
inate non-realistic equilibria, and they have a signiﬁcant impact on the ranking
of auction mechanisms. Third, we explicitly account for informational and risk
aversion asymmetries in the theoretic model. As previously mentioned, the sym-
metry assumption is empirically questionable in most Treasury auctions around
the world.10 Fourth, instead of simplifying the model for tractability purposes, we
rely on approximation techniques to solve the complex theoretic models. Finally,
we apply an alternative estimation approach that enables to take advantage of all
the information available in the sample.
3. A Share Auction Model with Asymmetric Bidders and
Risk Aversion
The model adopted is largely inspired from Wang and Zender (2002). A speciﬁc
quantity of a perfectly divisible good is for sale to N competitive bidders (N ≥ 2)
each maximizing his ex-ante expected utility.11 A bidder’s decision to participate
in the auction (i.e., to submit a competitive bid) is assumed to be exogenous and
common knowledge. The quantity supplied to the bidders by the auctioneer is
unknown at the time of the auction.12 From the players perspective, the quantity
supplied is a random variable Q ∈ ΘQ, with cumulative distribution function
(c.d.f.) G(Q).T h ea c t u a lv a l u eV ∈ ΘV of the good is the same to each bidder,
9See e.g., Wilson (1979), Das and Sundaram (1996), Wang and Zender (2002), as well as
Ausubel and Cramton (2002).
10Hortaçsu (2002a) also considers the eﬀect of a potential distributional asymmetry. He ﬁnds
that the presence of informational asymmetry would not modify the overall nature of the results
he obtained under the symmetry assumption.
11Following most of the Treasury auction literature, non-competitive bids are assumed to re-
sult from exogenous decisions made prior to the auction. Therefore, non-competitive bidding
will not be explicitly modelled, and it is assumed to aﬀect only the quantity available to com-
petitive bidders. The competitive bidders will be referred, in the remainder, as the “bidders”,
the “players”, or the “participants” unless mentioned otherwise
12In practice, the quantity available to competitive bidders is uncertain because non-
competitive bids, which are frequently used in French Treasury auctions, are only revealed
after the auction. In addition, some of the uncertainty also originates from the fact that the
French Treasury announces only a bracket for the total quantity of securities to be supplied to
competitive and non-competitive bidders.
7but it is unknown at the time of the auction. The c.d.f. of the true value, denoted
F0 (V |δ), depends on a parameter δ to be estimated.
We consider that two groups of asymmetric bidders, respectively composed of
N1 and N2 bidders (N1 + N2 = N), participate in the auction.13 Bidders within
a given group are symmetric, but bidders are asymmetric across groups. To
derive this asymmetric model, we will therefore consider a representative bidder
in each of the two groups. Bidder i in group l =1 ,2 receives a signal, si,l ∈ ΘS
containing some private information about the value of the good. This signal is
generated from a conditional distribution with c.d.f. Fl (si,l|V,σl),w h e r e(σ1,σ2)
are parameters to be estimated.14
After bidder i in group l receives the private signal si,l, she submits a sealed
bid. This bid consists of a schedule specifying the share of the good demanded
ϕi,l (p,si,l) for any price p>0. The demand schedules are assumed to be (piece-
wise) continuously diﬀerentiable. The market clearing price p0 is deﬁned as the
















= Q given p
0 ≥ 0 .
At Treasury auctions, the above price is often called the stop-out-price. Winning
bids are those submitted for prices greater than the stop-out-price. In other
words, bidder i in group l receives a quantity ϕi,l (p0,s i,l). In order to derive
the equilibrium strategies for both auction formats simultaneously, we adopt the
notation of Viswanathan and Wang (2000), and denote the payment of bidder i













i is the highest price for which bidder i’s demand is strictly positive.
Within this formulation, τ =0corresponds to the price paid under the uniform-
13The methodology developed below trivially generalizes to a larger number of asymmetric
groups. Interviews with representants of the French government in charge of conducting the
auctions indicated that participants in French Treasury auctions could essentially be divided in
two distinct groups.
14We assume in the remainder that the distributions of the private signals, and the distrib-
utions of the private signals conditional on the common value have the same support for both
types of bidders.
8price format, and τ =1corresponds to the price paid under the discriminatory
format.



















ϕi,l (p,si,l)dp .( 3 . 1 )
To account for risk aversion, we assume that bidder i in group l has a CARA













,( 3 . 2 )
where λl > 0 is the constant level of absolute risk aversion for players in group l.15
We adopt the CARA speciﬁcation because, unlike other speciﬁcations often used
with private-values auctions, it enables one to optimize an individual’s utility
without requiring to know his wealth. In addition, the CARA speciﬁcation is
well suited for common-value auctions as the utility remains deﬁned for any gain
and loss. Note however, that the absolute risk aversion level of an individual is
typically considered to vary with its wealth. In lack of full information regarding
bidders’ identity and wealth, we assume that auctions’ proﬁts do not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the wealth of the participants. In other words, λl will be assumed to remain
constant over the period spanned by our sample of French Treasury auctions.
4. Constrained Strategic Equilibrium
To the best of our knowledge, the asymmetric share auction model we just pre-
sented cannot be solved analytically. Approximation methods therefore appear
to be the only feasible approach to solve the model without imposing simplify-
ing assumptions.16 We adopted the Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (hereafter
CSE) technique developed by Armantier, Florens and Richard (2002) (hereafter
AFR) to approximate untractable BNE. As we shall see, this approach appears to
15More than the bank itself, we suspect that the bank’s employee(s) in charge of bidding in
Treasury auctions may exhibit risk aversion, as his job may depend on how he performs.
16Hortaçsu (2002b) also argues in favor of the use of approximations methods to solve Treasury
auction models, and in particular discriminatory auction models, which are often analytically
intractable. The approximation technique he adopts, although slightly diﬀerent, relies on com-
parable principles as the method we now present.
9provide the proper combination of accuracy and computational speed necessary
to solve and estimate the asymmetric French Treasury auction model. The CSE
method is now summarized in the general framework of a game of incomplete
information.
There are N players, each endowed with a privately known ’signal’ ξi ∈ Ξi
where Ξi ⊂ Rp. The signals ξ =( ξ1,...,ξN) are drawn from a joint distribution
with cumulative distribution function F (ξ). After observing their own signal,
players select simultaneously an action xi ∈ Xi,w h e r eXi denotes the set of pos-
sible actions player i can take. Players are endowed with individual Von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility functions Ui (x,ξ),w h e r ex =( x1,...,xN).As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle
ϕ =( ϕ1,...,ϕN),w h e r eϕ ∈ H,a n dH =
N T
i=1
Hi is the set of possible strategies, is
deﬁned by N measurable functions transforming signals into actions
ϕi : Ξi → Xi
ξi → xi = ϕi (ξi),i =1 ,...,N . (4.1)
The joint distribution F, the utility functions {Ui}i=1,...N, and the sets of strategies
{Hi}i=1,...N are assumed to be common knowledge.
The deﬁnition of a CSE parallels that of a BNE in strategic form, except that
strategies are restricted to subsets H
(k)
i ⊂ Hi,w h e r ek is a scalar to be deﬁned





i is therefore a strategic




































i ,∀i =1 ,...,N , (4.2)
where h Ui (ϕ)=Eξ [Ui (ϕ(ξ),ξ)]. The CSE may also be expressed as a ﬁxed point

















∀i =1 ,...,N . (4.3)
The determination of this ﬁxed point is greatly simpliﬁed when the strategies in
H
(k)




i ⊂ Rk.T h i s
approach provides a major computational advantage, since it requires to optimize
10over a ﬁnite set of parameters rather than an inﬁnite set of functions as it is the
case with BNE.
AFR determine conditions for the existence of a CSE. The authors also show in




k=1,...,∞ is such that i) H(k) ⊂ H(k+1) and ii) ∪
k≥1
H(k) is dense in H,















constitutes a convergent sequence, and ϕ
(k)
CSE is the
unique CSE in H(k) (∀k>0), then the sequence of CSEs converges toward the
unique BNE of the game. Finally, AFR (2002) propose a powerful algorithm,
based on Monte Carlo simulations, to derive the CSE numerically at a high level
of generality.
Four criteria have been proposed to evaluate in practice the quality of the CSE
approximation, and to decide when to stop the numerical approximation proce-
dure consisting in calculating a CSE in expanding constrained sets H(k).17 The
ﬁrst criterion is similar to traditional approximation stopping rules, as it veriﬁes
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and expected utility C3 (k)=

















  .18 In par-
ticular, C3 (k) close to zero indicates that players have little incentive to deviate
from the CSE to adopt a more elaborated (unconstrained) strategy. Finally, the
CSE is reinterpreted in the fourth criteria as an actual BNE in a perturbed game in
which private signals are generated from a distribution Fϕ
(k)
CSE
, rather than the ac-
tual distribution F. The approximation quality is then evaluated by the distance
between the original and perturbed games, as measured by C4 (k)=




When the distribution F is estimated, the criterion C4 (k) also provides some in-
17See AFR (2002) for details related to the evaluation of these criteria with Monte Carlo














response of player i (i =1 ,...,N) in the unconstrained set of strategy Hi, when his opponents
use the CSE ϕ
(k)


























11f o r m a t i o no nt h es p e c i ﬁcation error due to the use of the approximation ϕ
(k)
CSE
instead of the actual BNE in the structural econometric model. Indeed, C4 (k)
suﬃciently close to 0 indicates that the speciﬁcation error is marginal, since a
consistent estimation of Fϕ
(k)
CSE
with the correctly speciﬁed structural model (i.e.,
based on the corresponding BNE ϕ
(k)
CSE), would have yielded an estimate essen-
tially similar to the original distribution F.
The CSE approach has been successfully applied to the theoretical and em-
pirical analysis of several complex auction models with untractable BNEs. For
instance, AFR (1998) analyze a procurement from the French aerospace industry,
in which the good for sale is allocated to the player bidding the lowest ratio of
quality over price. AFR (2002) approximate a similar model under the additional
assumption of bidders collusion, or informational asymmetry. AFR (2001) eval-
uate the welfare implications associated with the use of a complex redistributive
allocation mechanism (known as the “Juste Retour”) at European Spatial Agency
procurements. Finally, Eklöf (2003) applies the CSE approach to estimate the so-
cial cost implied by the ineﬃcient allocation of contracts in ﬁrst-price-sealed-bid
procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders.
In these applications, the constrained set H(k) was deﬁned as a polynomial
of degree k, or a piecewise linear function with k breaking points.19 Intuitively,
the CSE approach reduces in these cases to approximating any unconstrained
strategy, and in particular any BNE, with a suitable polynomial or piecewise linear
function. The criteria of convergence were used in these applications to decide
the appropriate degree of the polynomial, or number of breaking points, that
provided a suﬃciently accurate approximation. It is important to note that, in
empirical applications, the quality of the CSE approximation calculated with the
estimated distribution may be arbitrarily precise. Indeed, the parameter k and the
dimension of the Monte Carlo simulation used to calculate the CSE numerically,
are fully independent of the sample size.
AFR (2002), as well as Eklöf (2003), also show that the CSE approach typi-
cally outperforms alternative approximation methods (consisting in solving a set
of diﬀerential or Euler equations) not only in terms of accuracy, but also in terms
of computational speed. This latter aspect is crucial in the present context, since
the subsequent structural estimation requires to evaluate the approximated equi-
19Although more sophisticated constrained strategies may be considered, we ﬁnd that simple
polynomials and piecewise linear functions i) provide very accurate approximations, ii) are
numerically undemanding, iii) have appropriate properties to address the question of the CSE
existence.
12librium for each auction in our sample an extremely large number of time (roughly
1012 time). Our experience with alternative approximations techniques suggests
that they would have been inappropriately slow to estimate the French Treasury
auction model. Moreover, unlike other forms of approximation, the CSE shares
with the BNE the property of being strictly monotonic in a wide range of games.
This characteristic is crucial in empirical applications, since the structural econo-
metric estimation techniques previously mentioned require monotonic strategies.
In other words, the CSE approach is fast, accurate, and robust, and it appears to
b et h em o s ta d e q u a t ea p p r o x i m a t i o nm e t h o df o rt h es t r u c t u r a le s t i m a t i o no ft h e
French Treasury auction model.
5. CSE for Auctions of Shares
Let us denote ϕ
(k)
i,l (p,si,l,d i,l),w h e r edi,l ∈ Rk, the strategy of player i in group



























− Q =0 ,
where d =( d1,1,...,dN1,1,d 1,2,...,dN2,2).W e c a n t h e n w r i t e p0 as a function
p0 (s,d,Q) of the strategies, the quantity available to competitive bidders, and
the signals s =( s1,s 2),w h e r esl =( s1,l,...,sNl,l) and l =1 ,2.T h ep r o ﬁtf u n c t i o n



















i,l (p,si,l,d i,l)dp ,
and her (unconditional) expected utility may then be written as










where ∆(Q,V,s) is the joint distribution of the quantity supplied, the true value
V , and the vector of private signals s.
13W ec a nt h e nd e r i v et h eﬁrst order conditions deﬁning the constrained best-

































































i,l (·) is the primitive of ϕ
(k)

























i,2 (p0,s j,2,d j,2).
In the remainder, we concentrate on pure strategy equilibria in which play-





l,CSE ,o re q u i v a l e n t l ydi,l,CSE = dl,CSE (∀i =1 ,...,Nl and ∀l =1 ,2).
Since the parameter dl,CSE is of dimension k, and since we can consider only a
representative player in each group, the determination of the CSE reduces to ﬁnd-
ing the ﬁxed point of a system of 2k non-redundant ﬁrst order conditions of the
form (5.1). The integrals in this system of equations may be approximated with
arbitrary precision by standard Monte Carlo techniques. For instance, the expec-
tations may be replaced by empirical means of simulated points. However, given
the relatively high dimension of the integrals involved, such an approach would be
extremely time consuming. Instead, Quasi Monte Carlo techniques, developed to
improve coverage, are used to increase the precision of the approximation, while
relying on fewer number of simulations (see Judd 1998).
Moreover, note that the resolution of the system of non-linear equations lead-
i n gt ot h eC S Ei sn o ta sc o m p l e xa si tﬁrst appears. Indeed, for an appro-










i,l (·) may be derived analytically, which considerably reduces the computa-
tional burden. In addition, the problem is more straightforward from a numerical
perspective, than most of the traditional auction models (see e.g., AFR 2002).
Indeed, the utility functions in traditional auction models are discontinuous in
14players actions and strategies. Consequently, smoothing techniques must be used
to solve eﬃciently these problems numerically. In the present context, the utility
functions are continuous which simpliﬁes signiﬁcantly the numerical integrations.
6 .T h eM a r k e ta n dt h eD a t a
6.1. The market
Our sample consists of discriminatory auctions held for two types of French gov-
ernment securities, the OAT and the BTAN. The OAT are the government’s
long-term debt instruments with maturities ranging from seven to thirty years.
The BTAN represent medium-term government debts with a maturity of either
two or ﬁve years.
The timing of these auctions unfold as follows: auctions for OAT and BTAN
are held respectively the ﬁrst and the third Thursday of each month. Four busi-
ness days before the auction, the “Agence France Trésor”, which is in charge of
conducting the auction, announces the details of the diﬀerent “lines” to be auc-
tioned. A line consists of either an OAT or a BTAN with speciﬁc characteristics
including the nominal yield, the maturity, as well as a bracket for the volume of
security (expressed in Euros) to be served to competitive and non-competitive
bidders. Part of the announced Treasury security may then be traded on a pri-
mary (or “when-issued”) market until the date of the auction by a limited number
of authorized dealers.
Competitive bidders may submit a demand function. A quantity demanded is
in fact an amount in Euros representing a share of the quantity sold by the Trea-
sury. Prices are expressed as a percentage (formulated with two decimal digits)
of the nominal value of the security (one Euro).20 Moreover, pre-qualiﬁed bidders
may submit a non-competitive oﬀer for any line, consisting in a (limited) amount
that will be systematically served at a price equal to the (quantity weighted) av-
erage price of the awarded competitive bids. Bids by eligible institutions, for all
lines to be auctioned that day, must be submitted either electronically or in sealed
envelops at least 10 minutes prior to the auction.
Before the bids submitted are observed, the French Treasury sets the exact
quantity that will be supplied to competitive and non-competitive bidders.21 Com-
20The Treasury securities are expressed in Euros since 1999. The 1998 auctions expressed in
French Francs, were converted in Euros at the rate of 1 Euro for 6,55957 Francs.
21To the best of our knowledge, the French Treasury does not act strategically when setting
15petitive bids are then ranked in descending order, and the stop-out-price is deter-
mined in such a way that the aggregate competitive and non-competitive demand
matches the exact quantity supplied. In order to adjust the quantity issued as pre-
cisely as possible, the Agence France Trésor reserves the right to scale-down bids
at the lowest accepted price on a pro-rata basis. Auction results are announced
within ﬁve minutes after the end of the auction, and the Banque de France com-
pletes the delivery-versus-payment orders with the auction winners within three
business days. The security may then be traded to the general public on a sec-
ondary market.22
Although occasional bidders may participate, the French State’s policy is-
suance essentially relies on a network of primary dealers (a.k.a. “Spécialistes en
Valeurs du Trésor”). The role of these primary dealers is essentially to be active
on the primary market, and to maintain a liquid secondary market. During the
period studied, the primary dealers were composed of 19 institutions accounting
for over 90% of the securities bought. The participation of the primary deal-
ers to each French Treasury auction may vary notably between ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. In particular, the Agence France Trésor identiﬁed ﬁve large ﬁnancial
institutions (Crédit Agricole, Deutsch Bank, BNP-Paribas, Morgan Stanley, and
Société Générale) who were allocated during our sample period more than 50%
of the securities issued.
To conclude this section, note that the presence of non-competitive bids, and
the dominating participation of large ﬁnancial institutions, suggest that a prac-
titioner should account for supply uncertainty and asymmetries across bidders,
in order to test whether these factors play a signiﬁcant role in French Treasury
auctions.
the exact quantity to be supplied. Conversations with French Treasury auctions specialists
indicate that the ﬁnal quantity decision appears to be an adjustment to exogenous short term
shocks. Note also that, unlike Back and Zender (2001), the French government does not have
an incentive to set endogenously the amount of security supplied, as the quantity available
to competitive bidders in French Treasury auctions is random, in part due to the presence of
non-competitive bids.
22The opening price of a security on the secondary market is often considered to be an im-
perfect measure of its actual value at the time of the auction. Indeed, there is a delay between
the auction and the beginning of the trading period on the secondary market, actors on the
secondary market may have heterogenous transaction costs, and less than half of the auctioned
securities are in general traded on the secondary market (see Hortaçsu 2002a). Therefore, the
true value of the security will be assumed to be an unobserved random variable whose distrib-
ution needs to be estimated.
166.2. Data
The sample consists of 118 auctions (60 OAT and 58 BTAN) which took place
at 64 diﬀerent dates between May 1998 and December 2000. For each auction
we observe i) the security pre-announced characteristics: the nominal yield, the
maturity, whether the line is an OAT or a BTAN, and the upper and lower bounds
of the bracket for the quantities served to the competitive and noncompetitive
bidders; ii) the number of bidders in each group;23 iii) the quantity demanded for
all prices by each individual bidder; and iv) the auction’s outcomes: the stop-out-
price, and the quantity served to each bidder. In addition, although our sample
does not enable to identify any individual participant, it speciﬁes whether a bidder
belongs to the class of large or small ﬁnancial institutions.
Summary statistics describing the auctions in our sample may be found in
Table 1. Participation in French Treasury auctions appears to be dominated by
smaller ﬁnancial institutions (14.6 small banks versus 4.5 large banks). Although
the number of bidders within groups may vary, the average number of participants
(roughly 19) is rather stable across auctions and lines. As expected, the yield and
m a t u r i t yo ft h eO A Ta r es i g n i ﬁcantly larger than the BTAN’s (respectively 5.5%
and 16 years for the OAT, versus 4.1% and nearly 3.5 years for the BTAN). The
average volume of securities oﬀered to competitive bidders (around 1,560 million
Euros) may vary markedly from one auction to the next. This volatility may
be only partially explained by non-competitive bids which represent on average
slightly less than 3% of the total quantity supplied. Although in the minority,
large banks received a larger share of the security (63.8% on average). This
result is consistent with the fact that, on average, large banks submit higher
prices for the initial units demanded (101.193 versus 100.922 for small banks),
and pay slightly more per unit awarded (101.185 versus 100.180).24 According
with economic intuition, we also ﬁnd a strong negative correlation between the
average price paid and the quantity supplied by the Treasury. Interestingly, there
is also a negative correlation between the quantity supplied, and the share awarded
23As previously mentioned, and following most of the structural literature on auctions, partic-
ipation at a French Treasury auction is assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. This
assumption may be partially justiﬁed by the fact that a bidder’s participation may be inferred
from its activity on the primary market, as well as from pre-auction communications, which are
prevalent according to French Treasury auctions specialists.
24To remain consistent with the French Treasury auctions practices, prices are expressed as
a percentage of one euro. In other words, when we mention a price of 101.193, it actually
corresponds to a true price of 1.01193 euros.
17to large banks. In other words, small banks receive a greater percentage of the
securities issued in large auctions. Note also that the stop-out-price is slightly, but
not signiﬁcantly smaller for BTAN (99.804) than for OAT (102.476). Finally, the
revenue generated by the French Treasury during the period sampled (187 Billion
E u r o s )m a yb ea l m o s te q u a l l yd i v i d e db e t w e e nt h ea u c t i o n sf o rB T A Na n dO A T ,
and it essentially originates from the contribution of large banks (roughly 63%).
7. Model Speciﬁcation
7.1. Speciﬁcation of the Constrained Strategies
In practice, we deﬁne the family of constrained strategies H(k) for bidders in group
l =1 ,2 as the two-dimensional polynomials of highest degree k:
ϕ
(k)










m = j · (j +1 ) /2+j , h p = p − (µV − 4σV), h si,l = si,l − (µV − 4σV),a n d(µV,σV)
are the mean and the standard deviation of the true value.
To be more speciﬁc, the French Treasury auction model will be estimated in a
subsequent section with the constrained equilibrium CSE(2), derived within H(2),
the set of constrained polynomial strategies of highest degree two:25
ϕi,l = dl (0) + dl (1)
1
h si,l








+ dl (5) h p
2 . (7.2)
To evaluate the approximation quality of the CSE(2), the convergence criteria
will be calculated with two alternative constrained equilibria, the CSE(1) and
the CSE(3), derived in the constrained sets H(1) and H(3). A sw es h a l ls e e ,t h e
convergence criteria will be used to establish that the CSE(2) provides an excellent
approximation, and that the use of a higher order polynomial is not necessary.
At this point four remarks are in order. First, in practice, the standardization
of the prices and private signals (p,si,l) into (h p,h si,l) is necessary in order for the
constrained bid function (7.2) to be non-linear. Indeed, the bid function would
25In fact, a distinct CSE(2) will be calculated for each auction in our sample, as the exogenous
variables, such as the number of each type of bidders or the expected value of the security, vary
from one auction to the next.
18otherwise be essentially linear for any parameter value dl, since the variables si,l
and p are deﬁned in the French Treasury auctions over very small intervals roughly
centered around 100. Second, although non-negativity constraints on bids are im-
plicit in Wang and Zender (2002), numerical simulations of their model suggest
that the probability of demanding negative equilibrium quantities is far from neg-
ligible for a wide range of parameter values. To avoid such undesirable outcomes
at any step of our numerical algorithm, we explicitly impose non-negative quan-
tities. Third, although we impose dl (t) > 0 for all t (i.e. ∂ϕ
(k)
i,l (·)/∂p<0,a n d
∂ϕ
(k)
i,l (·)/∂si,l > 0) to speed up computation, we verify that these constraints are
non-binding at the equilibrium. As previously mentioned, the CSE is therefore
strictly monotonic in prices and signals, which is an essential attribute to conduct
a structural estimation. Fourth, to facilitate convergence at any step of the ap-
proximation algorithm, we only consider parameters for the constrained strategies
such that i) the bidders’ average proﬁts are non negative, and ii) the stop-out-
price systematically falls within the range of prices actually observed in the French
Treasury auction for which the CSE is calculated. These constraints are shown to
be non-binding at the equilibrium, but they considerably reduce computational
time.
We now brieﬂy motivate the choice of the family of constrained strategies
in (7.1), over alternative candidates. First, when k =1the CSE is consistent
with uniform-price auction examples in Wilson (1979), and Fevrier et al. (2002).
Second, the constrained strategies are bounded above when the private signals
become large, which, in our experience, is a crucial property to derive eﬃciently
the CSE numerically. Third, the CSE in this family of constrained strategies
performed remarkably well to approximate accurately the equilibrium strategies
derived analytically in speciﬁc examples of symmetric uniform-price auctions by
Wilson (1979), Fevrier et al. (2002), and Wang and Zender (2002). Fourth, it out-
performed several alternative speciﬁcations (e.g., other polynomial or piecewise
linear functions with a similar number of parameters) both in terms of approxi-
mation quality, and computational time.
In addition, the family of constrained strategies deﬁned in (7.1) has adequate
properties to address in practice the questions of the CSE existence, uniqueness,
and its relevance as an approximation. Indeed, if the (unconstrained) bid functions
may be assumed to be continuous in (p,si,l),a n d(p,si,l) have compact supports
bounded away from zero, then the generalization of the Weierstrass approximation
theorem to functions of two variables guarantees that any (unconstrained) bid
function may be approximated with arbitrary precision by a polynomial strategy
19of the form (7.1). In other words, the selected family of constrained sets is dense
in the set of possible strategies, and any BNE of the game may be approximated
by a sequence of CSEs.
Moreover, the existence of a CSE is established numerically in practice, by
applying theorems and algorithms developed in interval analysis for the solution
of nonlinear systems in the presence of computing rounding errors. In particular, if
a nonlinear system of equations F (x)=0 , F : Rp → Rp, is Lipschitz continuous,
then the application of the Krawczyk operator enables one to construct a box
within which the existence and uniqueness of a solution may be formally veriﬁed
numerically (see Neumaier 1990 and Kearfott 1996). Therefore, the existence and
the uniqueness of a CSE in H(k) may be veriﬁed by applying such an algorithm
to the set of ﬁrst order conditions (5.1), in the neighborhood of an approximate
solution derived numerically.26
The uniqueness result, however, is only local. In other words, as is often the
case in games of incomplete information, we cannot formally prove the global
uniqueness of a CSE.27 However, we were able to construct a box, centered on
the approximated solution dCSE =( d1,CSE,d 2,CSE), and with bounds [0,2dCSE],
within which the uniqueness of the CSE was formally established after applying
the Krawczyk operator.28 In addition, the CSE was re-calculated 106 time with an
independent and random selection of starting values, and all solutions converged
(in quadratic norm) toward the same CSE up to an ε =1 0 −12. This result
therefore strongly suggests that the CSE calculated is indeed unique within a
range of reasonable strategies.







in H(1) to H(5) was also calcu-
lated 106 time with an independent and random selection of starting values. As
further explained in section (9.2), each of the 106 sequences converged toward the
26The GLOBSOL project (http://www.mscs.mu.edu/~globsol/) maintains a list of Fortran
subroutines based on interval arithmetic to solve optimization problems and non-linear system
of equations.
27To facilitate the presentation, the discussion that follows concentrates on the uniqueness of
aC S Ea n daB N Ei nas p e c i ﬁc model. Recall however that the characteristics of the model,
and therefore the CSE calculated, are distinct for each auction in our sample, as the exogenous
variables diﬀer. In other words, the calculations described below to address the question of
uniqueness, were in fact (successfully) repeated for each auction in our sample.
28The fact that the uniqueness could not be established for some CSEs in wider boxes does
not necessarily implies that the solution is not unique, but rather that the uniqueness test was
inconclusive.
20same BNE up to an ε =1 0 −11.29 This result therefore strongly suggests that,
beside the equilibrium we approximated, there is no other well behaved BNE.
However, if the game happened to possess additional equilibria, then the previous
calculations show that the BNE approximated may at least be considered as a
sensible, strong focal point equilibrium. Under these circumstances, it may be
reasonably assumed, when we estimate the structural model, that agents have
coordinated on the BNE we approximated.
7.2. Speciﬁcation of the Econometric Model
Before we turn to the speciﬁcation of the structural model, we must estimate the
distribution of Qt, the quantity actually supplied at auction t to competitive bid-
ders. We assume that Qt is exogenously determined by the following relationship
Qt = α0 + α1MeanBrackett + α2SpreadBrackett +
α3Maturityt + α4Yi e ld t + α5Typet + υt , (7.3)
where MeanBrackett =( Q
t + Qt)/2, SpreadBrackett =( Qt − Q
t)/2, Qt and
Q
t are the upper and lower bounds of the quantity bracket announced by the
French Treasury before auction t,a n dυt is an identically and independently nor-
mally distributed error term with mean zero and variance σ2
υ.30 T h er e s u l t so f
the regression presented in Table 2 indicate that the quantity supplied, cannot be
explained solely by the bracket announced by the auctioneer. Indeed, the charac-
teristics of the security for sale (i.e., the maturity, yield and type) appear to have
a non-negligible impact on the quantity oﬀered to competitive bidders. Since the
parameter associated with the spread of the quantity bracket is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, we re-estimated the model without this variable (see Table 2).
The estimated parameters now fully characterize the probability distribution of
the quantity supplied to competitive bidders. In the remainder, it is assumed that
bidders know this distribution of Qt when they calculate their optimal strategy.
29This result contrasts sharply with similar calculations we originally conducted under the
assumption that the quantity supplied to competitive bidders is common knowledge. Indeed,
in this case the sequences of CSEs would either not converged, or they would converged toward
diﬀerent BNEs. The introduction of random supply is therefore not only empirically relevant,
but, as suggested by (e.g.) Wang and Zender (2002), it also appears to eliminate multiple
equilibria.
30On rare occasions, the French Treasury is known to supply a quantity slightly larger than
Qt. Consequently, we leave the distribution of Q unbounded.
21To complete the econometric speciﬁc a t i o n ,w ea s s u m et h a tVt, the true value of
the security at auction t, is normally distributed with mean µVt = δ0+δ1Yi e ld t+
δ2Maturityt + δ3Type t,a n dv a r i a n c eσ2
V. The conditional distribution of st
i,l,
the private signal at auction t of bidder i in group l (l =1 ,2), is assumed to
be a normal with mean Vt and variance σ2
l.31 Note that the assumption that
the variables Q, V ,a n dsi,l are normally distributed not only is standard in
econometrics, but it is also supported by the graphs of the variables respective
(estimated) values. Moreover, unlike Fevrier et al. (2002) and Castellanos and
Oviedo (2002) who adopted a exponential distribution, the private signals are
symmetrically distributed around the true value, which appears to be a natural
assumption.
8. Estimation of the Structural Model
The objective of the inference method presented here, is to estimate the unknown
structural parameter θ =( β,σ1,σ2,λ1,λ2),w h e r eβ =( δ0,δ1,δ2,δ3,σV) char-
acterizes the distribution of the true value of the security. To do so, we apply
the method of simulated moments (MSM) as originally introduced by McFadden
(1989), and Pakes and Pollard (1989).









,w h e r eq
j,t
i,l is the endogenous variable representing the quantity
demanded at price pj (j =1 ,...,Jt) by bidder i (i =1 ,...,N l,t) in group l (l =1 ,2)
at auction t (t =1 ,...,T),a n dZ
j,t
l =( 1 ,p j,zt
l) is a 11 × 1 vector of exogenous
variables, in which zt
l accounts for some of the characteristics of group l and of
auction t.32
The observed bid q
j,t
i,l is assumed to be determined, up to an error term, by
31To guarantee that a sequence of CSE approximates an equilibrium we have previously
assumed that the support of the private signals is compact. To remain consistent with this
assumption, we can truncate the distribution of the private types far in the tail. Therefore,
when approximating a CSE, we only consider signals within 5 standard deviations around their
mean. This type of truncation was adopted by (e.g.) AFR (2001) and Eklöf (2003), and it is
inconsequential for the econometric estimation.
32In practice, we consider zt
l =

Yi e l d t,Maturity t,Type t,N 1,t,N 2,t,Q
t,Qt,QNCB t,Largel
 
where Largel is a dummy variable equal to 1 when l =1(i.e. when the bank belongs to the
group of large ﬁnancial institutions), and QNCBt is the percentage of the total quantity supplied
demanded by non-competitive bidders at auction t.















i,l is the private signal of bidder i in group l at auction t,a n dω
j,t
i,l is an









The error term may be interpreted as a combination of three factors: players
mistakes when deriving or playing their equilibrium strategies, measurement errors
due to the fact that bidding is only permitted in practice on a grid of prices, and
approximation errors due to the use of a CSE.




















demanded at price pj by a bidder in group l during auction t, conditionally on
the vector of exogenous variables Z
j,t
l . We can then generate a set of moment
















The generalized method of moments estimator is based on the empirical counter-
part of the previous orthogonality conditions:
e θGMM =Arg min
θ∈Θ
[A















,( 8 . 2 )
and Ω is a 11×11 symmetric, positive deﬁnite matrix that may be chosen in order
to minimize the variance of the estimator. Note that this model is over-identiﬁed,
as there are eleven moment conditions to estimate a parameter of dimension nine.
In the present context, the generalized method of moments estimator is not






c a n n o tb ed e r i v e da n a l y t -
ically. Following the MSM technique, as reviewed by Carasco and Florens (2002),
























,w h e r eMC is the size of the Monte Carlo simulation,
and h st








33Note that the addition of an error term to the equilibrium bid function is necessary in
practice to reconcile for each auction in our sample, a bidder’s unique private signal, with the
diﬀerent quantities she demanded at each of the possible prices. Otherwise, the inversion of an
equilibrium bid function at each of the observed bids q
j,t
i,l submitted at prices pj (j =1 ,...,Jt)
would not necessarily result in the unique private signal st
i,l.
23Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) show that the MSM estimator is strongly
consistent and asymptotically normal when MC is ﬁxed. In addition, they show










































However, Ω∗ cannot be derived directly as it depends on the unknown distribu-




















































































































M i st h es a m p l es i z e ,h st










m=1,...,MC2 is a new sequence of MC2 simulated signals randomly and
independently generated from the distribution f





; e θr (∀r ≥ 1) is the
MSM estimator of θ calculated with the weighting matrix e Ω∗
r−1,a n de Ω∗
0 is the
identity matrix. In practice we set r =2 , MC =1 0 6 and MC2 =1 0 8.
Note that unlike Fevrier et al. (2002), we take full advantage of each obser-
vation (i.e., each price-quantity pair observed for each bidder), rather than only
the quantities submitted at the stop-out-price by the winning bidders.34 More
precisely, not only do we take into considerations every prices at which a bid is
submitted (i.e., the points at which an observed (step) demand function strictly
34The sample used in our estimation method consists of 40,496 observations, while it would
have been reduced to 1,158 observations had we taken into account only the quantities observed
at the stop-out-price.
24decreases), but we also account in the estimation process for all possible prices
in our sample, for which a bidder did not require an additional share (i.e., the
prices at which a demand function remains ﬂat). This latter set of data points
should not be ignored, as it also contains information about the bidders’ strategy.
I n d e e d ,s u c ho b s e r v a t i o n si n d i c a t et h a ta tag i v e np r i c et h eb i d d e rd i dn o tw i s h
to modify the quantity she demanded.
As is often the case with structural models, the global identiﬁcation of the
model is far from trivial to establish. We derive in appendix a numerical procedure
that allows us to conﬁrm that our model is locally identiﬁed around the parameters
estimated in the subsequent section. As suggested by Athey and Haile (2002), as
well as Campo, Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2002), this identiﬁcation result may
be explained intuitively by the fact that we exploit the observed heterogeneity
between the auctions in our sample. For instance, the identiﬁcation of the risk
aversion parameters may be attributed to the variation in the number of each
type of bidders, as these variables enter the expected utility functions, but not
the distributions of the values or signals. Note also that the number of exogenous
variables necessary to obtain identiﬁcation, prevents us from estimating the model
semi- or non-parametrically (as in Guerre et al. 2000), as we would then face
the “curse of dimensionality” problem. Our model, however, relies on similar
parametric assumptions as (e.g.) Paarsch (1992), and Donald and Paarsch (1993,
1996) in the estimation of single unit auctions, as well as Fevrier et al. (2002) in
the estimation of a Treasury auction model.
9. Estimation Results
9.1. Estimated Structural Parameters
The value of the estimated parameters are presented in Table 3. In order to draw
some comparisons with the auctions outcomes observed in our sample, we use the
estimated parameters to conduct 106 Monte Carlo simulations for each auction in
our sample. The results of these simulations are summarized in Table 4.
Let us concentrate ﬁrst on the parameters (δk,σV) characterizing the mean
and standard deviation of the value of a security. As expected, δ1 is signiﬁcantly
greater than 0, reﬂecting the fact that the value of a security increases (on aver-
age) with its yield. Table 3, also indicates that long term securities are on average
slightly less valuable to bidders (δ2 < 0). Note, however, that after controlling
for the maturity, and according with opinions expressed by French Treasury spe-
25cialists, we do not ﬁnd any evidence indicating that the value of the two types of
short and long term securities diﬀers signiﬁcantly (i.e., δ3 is insigniﬁcant). Table
3 indicates that the values of the estimated parameters vary slightly when we
impose δ3 =0 . In the remainder, we only rely on this new set of signiﬁcant struc-
tural parameters when conducting Monte Carlo simulations. The average value
of a security in our sample is evaluated at 101.772, 0.610 above the average stop-
out-price (see Table 4). The estimated diﬀerence between the true value and the
stop-out-price is signiﬁcantly smaller than the one found by Fevrier et al. (2002)
(i.e. 1.85). Recall, however, that Fevrier et al. studied a diﬀerent period (1995),
and that the sample they use is substantially smaller. Finally, note that the true
value of a security conditional on the exogenous variables is somewhat variable,
since the standard deviation σV is estimated at 0.632 (Table 3).35
We now turn to the estimation of the standard deviations of private signals.
Table 3 indicates that small banks receive noisier signals (i.e., σ2 > σ1).T ot e s t
for informational symmetry (i.e., σ2 = σ1) we adopt the extension to the general
method of moment framework of the Wald test (see e.g., Newey and West 1987).
The Wald statistic is 113.291, which corresponds to a P-value of 2.665E-4. In
other words, we can reject the hypothesis that participants to the French Treasury
auctions have access to the same source of information regarding the value of the
security for sale. Nothing indicates, however, whether the informational advantage
of large banks is due to better market research, inferences from the ﬂow of pre-
auction orders submitted to large banks by their own customers (as suggested
by Bikchandani and Huang 1993), or informal pre-auction communications (as
suggested by Nandi 1997 and Hortaçsu 2002).
Finally, Table 3 also indicates that the CARA parameter of small banks is
more than one hundred time larger.36 The CARA speciﬁcation however, does
not include risk neutrality as a special case. Therefore, we must adopt a non-
nested approach to test whether bidders are risk neutral. Following Singleton
(1985), we create a more general structural model nesting as special cases both
Treasury auction models under the CARA (model M1) and risk neutrality (model
35The standard deviation of the true value and the standard deviation of the privates signals
are not explicitly given in Fevrier et al. (2002). Therefore, we have not been able to compare
our estimates with theirs.
36The estimated absolute risk aversion parameters may appear rather low, if not compared to
the proﬁts of the bidders. Indeed, the relative risk aversion levels range between 0.02 and 0.9
when calculated with the proﬁts only. These ﬁgures, although still low since they do not include
the actual wealth of the participants, appear however more reasonable.
26M2) assumptions.37 The implementation of the test however, only requires to re-
estimate the model under the risk neutrality assumption. We ﬁnd that the statistic
associated with the test of M1 against M2 (respectively M2 against M1) is 1.789
(9.180), which corresponds to a P-value of 0.181 (2.446E-3). Therefore, we are
lead to conclude in favor of the presence of risk aversion. We also performed a
test similar to the one previously conducted to verify informational symmetry,
in order to test for the equality of the risk aversion parameters between the two
groups of bidders (i.e., λ2 = λ1). The test statistic is 24.406, which corresponds
to a P-value of 7.803E-7. In other words, we can reject the hypothesis that both
types of bidders have comparable level of risk aversion. These results, however,
are not suﬃcient to compare bidders in terms of relative risk aversion. Indeed,
small and large banks typically have diﬀerent levels of wealth. Individual data
on the participants’ wealth were not accessible to us. However, the simulations
conducted in Table 4 indicate that the average proﬁts per auction of a small and
a large bank are respectively around 0.14 and 1.27 million Euros. Therefore, if it
may be assumed, as a simpliﬁcation, that a bank’s wealth is roughly proportional
to its proﬁts in the French Treasury auctions, then small banks’ relative level of
risk aversion is 13.3 time larger. In other words, the estimation of the structural
parameters conﬁrms that large ﬁnancial institutions possess better information,
and are willing to take more risks.
It is interesting to note that the informational and risk aversion asymmetries
have unequal consequences on the auction outcomes in general, and the Treasury
revenues in particular. Indeed, if small banks were to receive private signals
generated from the same distribution as their larger counterparts, then, all things
being equal otherwise, this would raise the Treasury’s revenue by 12%, while the
average proﬁts of a large (small) bank would decrease (increase) by 21% (8%).38
Alternatively, if small banks had the same CARA parameter as large banks (but
still receive noisier information), then the Treasury’s revenue would barely change
(+3%), while the small (large) banks’ proﬁts would only increase (decrease) by
3% (7%). In other words, beneﬁts to the French Treasury would be non-negligible
if participants had access to similar sources of information. This result may be
of importance, since, unlike risk aversion, policy makers may be able to curb
37The risk neutral model is derived and approximated along the same lines as the CARA
model, except that bidders maximize their expected proﬁts in equation (3.1), instead of their
expected utility in equation (3.2).
38The unequal eﬀect of a reduction of the informational asymmetry on small and large banks
may be explained by the fact that the security is now allocated to a larger number of small
banks.
27down the informational asymmetry. Indeed, it may be possible, for instance, to
regulate pre-auction communications, which is often believed to be one of the
principal sources of informational asymmetry.
Table 4 also indicates, as previously mentioned, that large and small banks
expected proﬁts are roughly 1.27 and 0.14 million Euros per auction.39 These
ﬁgures, however, do not include any research or administrative costs typically
incurred while participating in Treasury auctions. Finally, it is important to note
that large banks appear to be facing a non-negligible winner’s curse problem.40
Indeed, the share of securities awarded to a large bank is bought at an average
price exceeding the true value of the security 8.5% of the time. In sharp contrast,
s m a l lb a n k s ,w h i c hb e h a v em o r ep r u d e n t l y ,a r ea ﬀected by the winner’s curse for
only 1% of the shares they received.
Finally, the simulations in Table 4 suggest that the estimated model is sensible,
as it replicates fairly well the outcomes observed in our sample of French Treasury
auctions. For instance, the simulated stop-out-price, the average price paid by
unit, the highest price at which a positive quantity was demanded, the repartition
of the security between each type of banks, and the revenue generated by the
Treasury, are very similar in Tables 1 and 4. In addition, the negative correlations
observed in the sample between the quantity of security issued on one hand, and
the average price paid or the share allocated to large banks on the other hand,
are also identiﬁed with our simulated model.
9.2. Approximated Equilibrium
Although apparently sensible, the quality of the previous results is crucially con-
tingent on the fact that the CSEs considered for the estimation of the structural
model are accurate approximations of the equilibria in each Treasury auction in
our sample. Therefore, we now turn to the evaluation of the CSE(2), its theoreti-
cal properties, and the convergence criteria. The parameters of a CSE(2), derived
for both types of players and speciﬁc values of the exogenous variables, are re-
ported in Table 5. The corresponding bid functions are illustrated by the solid
lines in Graph 1, and the inﬂuence of the private signals on the bids submitted
39This result is consistent with Umlauf (1993) who found that large bidders earn signiﬁcantly
larger proﬁts in Mexican Treasury bill auctions.
40The “winner’s curse” is said to occur when a winning bidder realizes that the price he paid
exceeds the value of the object he was awarded. See Capen, Clapp and Campbell (1971), as
well as Kagel (1995) for empirical and experimental evidence of the winner’s curse in single-unit
auctions.
28may be appreciated in Graph 2. Finally, the convergence criteria may be found
in Table 6.41
Graph 1 conﬁrms that small banks behave more prudently. Indeed, the de-
mand functions submitted by small banks are not only shifted downward, but they
are also slightly ﬂatter than the demand functions of their larger counterparts. In
other words, small banks systematically ask fewer shares at any possible price, and
they are not willing to pay as much to obtain an additional unit of the security.
Monte Carlo simulations suggest that the diﬀerences between the bid functions of
each group of players cannot be imputed solely to either the information or the
risk-aversion asymmetry. In fact, the shape of the strategies appears to be almost
equally inﬂuenced by the two sources of asymmetry.
Graph 2 indicates that private signals have a signiﬁcant impact on the bid
functions.42 For instance, in comparison with the average private signal of 101.772,
private signals of 101.807 and 101.912 (the mean of the private signals plus 0.5
and 2 standard deviations), yield a large bank a share approximately 10% and
30% larger on average.
Although the demand functions in Graph 1 appear essentially linear, the equi-
librium parameters in Table 5 indicate that the CSE is a non-linear function of
both prices and private signals (i.e., d(4) and d(5) are diﬀerent than 0). This
observation is conﬁrmed by the convergence criterion C3 in Table 6, which indi-
cates that any player has a strong incentive (especially in absolute terms given
the large amounts of money involved in Treasury auctions) to shift to an un-
constrained strategy when its opponents play the linear constrained equilibrium
CSE(1).43
The convergence criteria in Table 6 indicate that the CSE(2) is an excellent
approximation of the equilibrium since i) it almost perfectly matches its uncon-
strained best-response (criterion C1); and ii) it is a BNE in a game with an almost
41The convergence criteria reported in Table 6 are aggregated across both types of players.
These criteria, however, do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly when calculated separately with small or large
banks.
42The relative impact of private signals on the demand function submitted by both types of
players is roughly similar. Therefore, we only report in Graph 2 the eﬀect of private signals on
the strategy of large banks.
43In fact, if a small (respectively, large) bank best-responds with a quadratic constrained
strategy belonging to H(2) to its opponents, who all use the linear constrained equilibrium
CSE(1), then this player would increase its proﬁts by 5.70% (respectively 5.93%) on average.
In other words, bidders have a strong incentive in this situation to shift from a linear, to a
non-linear strategy belonging to H(2).
29identical distribution (criterion C4). Criterion C4 also conﬁrms that the speciﬁ-
cation error due to the use of the approximated equilibrium CSE(2) instead of
the actual BNE did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the estimation of the structural para-
meters of the model in Table 3. Note also that a higher order polynomial, would
considerably increase computational time, but it would not improve signiﬁcantly
the quality of the approximation, as indicated by the convergence criteria associ-
ated with the alternative CSE(3). This result is consistent with our experiences
with other auctions models. Indeed, although analytically complex and often
untractable, BNE in auction models are typically well behaved monotonic func-
tions that may be approximated accurately by a low order polynomial. In other
words, the CSE(2) adopted for the estimation of the structural model, provides a
parsimonious, yet sensible approximation.
An alternative approach to assess the pertinence of the approximated equi-
librium is to verify whether its properties are consistent with theoretical results
established analytically in the symmetric case.44 In accordance with Ausubel and
Cramton (2002), and Wang and Zender (2002), we ﬁnd that in our asymmetric
model i) both types of bidders shade their bids relative to their marginal valuation
of the security; ii) the intensity of a player’s bid shading increases with his risk
aversion and private signal; iii) equilibrium bid schedules, as well as the seller’s
expected revenue, increase with the number of participants (of any group), and
the expected value of the security, but they decrease with the bidder’s level of risk
aversion and the variance of the true value; and iv) the probability of the winner’s
c u r s ei sn o tz e r o ,i ti n c r e a s e sw i t ht h ev a r i a n c eo ft h et r u ev a l u ea n dt h en u m b e r
of participants, while it decreases with the bidder’s parameter of risk aversion. In
other words, the CSE(2) also appears to be sensible in the sense that it shares its
main properties with known symmetric equilibria.
10. Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Formats
Using the structural parameters estimated in the previous section (i.e. third
column in Table 3), we now approximate with a CSE(2) what would have been
the bidders equilibrium behavior, had the French Treasury conducted the auctions
in our sample with a uniform pricing rule. The parameters of a CSE(2) in the
uniform-price auctions are presented in Table 7, and the corresponding equilibrium
44Failure to be consistent with symmetric models does not necessarily invalidate our asym-
metric model, since properties from symmetric models do not necessarily extend to asymmetric
models.
30bid schedule are plotted in Graph 1 (dotted line). Then, using these approximated
equilibria, a Monte Carlo simulation has been conducted to compare the auctions
outcomes in the uniform-price format (Table 9), with those previously found in
the discriminatory format (Table 4).45
Note that when comparing the two pricing rules, we implicitly assume that the
variables considered exogenous, such as the quantity available to competitive bid-
ders or the number of competitive bidders, remain unaﬀected after switching to a
diﬀerent auction format. This assumption may be questioned since participation
and/or non-competitive bids could be expected to diﬀer between a discriminatory
and uniform-price auction. However, to the best of our knowledge, the diﬀerent
empirical analysis conducted after natural experiments did not ﬁnd any conclu-
sive evidence suggesting that a pricing rule signiﬁcantly aﬀe c t st h ev a r i a b l e st h a t
have been assumed exogenous in the present paper. This result may be partially
explained by the fact that the number of participants, and the number of banks
allowed to submit non-competitive bids, are typically inelastic in the short term.
Indeed, bidders must ﬁrst pre-qualify by receiving an accreditation from the gov-
ernment.
Before describing the equilibrium behavior in the uniform-price auction, let us
point out that the approximated equilibrium bid function CSE(2) is once again re-
markably precise, as indicated by the convergence criteria in Table 8. In addition,
the approximated equilibrium appears sensible, as its properties are consistent
with Ausubel and Cramton (2002), and with a comparable symmetric example in
Wang and Zender (2002). For instance, we ﬁnd that i) both types of bidders shade
their bids; ii) the intensity of bid shading falls compared to the discriminatory
case; iii) bid shading diminishes with added competition (from any group), iv)
reducing the severity of the winner’s curse through information revelation about
the true value and/or the amount of non-competitive bidding, increases the sell-
er’s expected revenue; v) the seller’s expected revenue increases with the average
value of a security, and the number of competitive bidders (from any group), while
it decreases with risk aversion, and the variance of the true value; vi) ﬁnally, the
demand of a bidder is strictly positive when the signal and the price are simul-
taneously equal to the average true value of the security (i.e., ϕ
(2)
l,CSE (pj,s i,l) > 0
45The Monte Carlo simulations rely on the common random number technique. In other
words, Tables 4 and 9 are constructed with the same exogenous variables and pseudo-random
private signals, and, therefore, they can be directly compared. In addition, the standard devia-
tions in Tables 4 and 9 are calculated across simulations, and across auctions in our sample. In
other words, these standard deviations should not be confused for a measure of the accuracy of
an estimate, as often presented along the results of a regression.
31when si,l = pj = µV).
To understand the diﬀerence between equilibrium behavior under each auction
format, it is important to remember that a fundamental characteristic of uniform-
price auctions is that bidders do not pay their bid for each unit they receive.
Instead, a winning bidder pays a single price, the stop-out-price, for every units
she is allocated. As a result, bidders are inclined to announce higher prices than
at discriminatory auctions, for the ﬁrst units demanded. Indeed, strategic bidders
realize that the stop-out-price they will have to pay will be lower than the price
they announced for these initial shares. This intuition is conﬁrmed in Table 9 and
Graph 1. Indeed, the highest prices at which bidders demand a strictly positive
share is lower for both types of bidders under the discriminatory format (101.204
and 100.945 for large and small banks, versus 101.449 and 101.325 in uniform-
price auctions). To compensate for the high prices submitted for the initial units,
we can also see in Graph 1 that the demand functions are ﬂatter in the uniform-
price auction (dotted lines), in order to keep the stop-out-price as low as possible.
As expected, however, the stop-out-price is always higher in the uniform-price
auction. Interestingly, the average stop-out-price in the uniform-price auction
lays between the average price paid by large and small winning banks in the
discriminatory format.
Note also that a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform-price format leads
small banks to take relatively more risk compared to their larger counterparts.
Indeed, Graph 1 shows that the demand function of small banks shifts upward,
and is only marginally ﬂatter in the uniform-price format. In other words, knowing
that they will not have to pay the price they announced, small banks are willing
to buy larger amounts of the security at any relevant price. The bid function of
large banks, on the other hand, rotates and becomes signiﬁcantly ﬂatter. As a
result, large banks are willing to pay more than in a discriminatory auction for
small quantities, but they do not wish to spend as much to obtain a large share
of the security.
According to our model, these strategy adjustments on the part of both types
of bidders when switching to the uniform-price format imply: i) the percentage
of the security awarded to small banks is signiﬁcantly higher (55% versus 37%
in the discriminatory format); ii) a larger number of small banks is likely to be
awarded a share of the security; and iii) the increase in the share allocated to small
banks is relatively higher at auctions with low quantities issued by the Treasury.
In other words, the negative correlation between the quantity supplied and the
share allocated to large banks is reduced under the uniform-price format. These
32theoretical predictions are consistent with the empirical observations in Malvey
and Archibald (1998) who report that the average share awarded to the top ﬁve
and top ten dealers declined by about 10% to 17% after the US Treasury shifted
to the uniform pricing rule.
The combined eﬀect of the uniform-price auction on the stop-out-price and
the allocation process, has in turn surprising consequences in terms of the banks’
utility, and the Treasury’s revenue. Indeed, Table 9, indicates that the expected
utilities of both types of banks, and the revenue of the Treasury would simulta-
neously increase under the uniform-price format. This result may be explained
by the combination of two factors. First, a comparison of Tables 4 and 9 in-
dicates that the uniform-price format signiﬁcantly reduces the variance of the
proﬁts for both types of bidders.46 This reduction in proﬁts’ volatility is such
that the expected utility of small banks, who are relatively more risk averse, in-
creases on average under the uniform pricing rule, even though their expected
proﬁts are actually 2.8% lower on average. The expected utility of large banks
increases as well in uniform-price auctions, since not only their proﬁts volatility
diminishes, but also their expected proﬁts rise following a reduction of the win-
ner’s curse problem (from 8.5% to 0.7% of the shares allocated).47 Second, as
previously mentioned, a comparison of Tables 4 and 9 indicates that the average
stop-out-price in the uniform-price auction (101.184) is larger than the average
price paid by small banks (101.179), but only slightly smaller than the average
price paid by large banks (101.186) under the discriminatory format. As a result,
the average price paid by a bank (regardless of type) for a unit of the security is
larger under the uniform-price format. This implies that the revenue raised by
the French Treasury during our sample period would have been higher under the
uniform price format. The uniform-price format therefore appears do dominate
the discriminatory format in French Treasury auctions, both from the Treasury’s
perspective, but also from a social welfare perspective.
Although the Treasury’s revenue increase is modest in relative terms (4.8%),
it is quite consequent in absolute terms. Indeed, we estimate that the French
Treasury would have accumulated an additional 9 billion Euros during our sample
46This reduction may be essentially explained by a decline, under the uniform-price format,
of the negative correlation between the quantity supplied by the Treasury on one hand, and the
average price paid and the share allocated to large banks on the other hand. In other words,
under the uniform pricing rule, banks receive more uniform shares and pay more uniform prices
independently of the quantity of security issued.
47Unlike Castellanos and Oviedo (2002), the reduction of the winner’s curse alone cannot
explain why the uniform price auction generates higher revenues for the French Treasury.
33period, had it used a uniform-price auction. Our simulations, however, suggest a
potential drawback associated with the uniform pricing rule. Indeed, the standard
deviations of the per-auction Treasury revenues in Tables 4 and 9 indicate that the
revenue raised by the Treasury is signiﬁcantly more variable from one auction to
the next under the uniform-price format.48 In other words, although the Treasury
revenue is higher under the uniform-price format, the precise amount of money
an auction will generate becomes less predictable. Under these circumstances, it
m a yb em o r ed i ﬃcult for the French government to use the uniform-price Treasury
auction as an eﬃcient short-term tool to manage its public debt.49
Our results are therefore consistent with the reduced-form analysis conducted
by Malvey and Archibald (1998) after the US Treasury decided to experience with
the uniform pricing rule. Indeed, the authors found: i) the revenue of the Trea-
sury increased slightly in relative terms, but not signiﬁcantly; and ii) the revenue
raised by the US Treasury became more variable from one auction to the next.
Moreover, our simulations illustrate why most reduced-form analyses conducted
after natural experiments have failed to produce an unambiguous ranking of auc-
tion mechanisms. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the uniform pricing rule would only result
in a relatively marginal increase in revenue, while simultaneously generating more
variable outcomes. In such a noisy environment, it would be extremely diﬃcult
to identify such a small revenue diﬀerence with a reduced-form analysis. The task
m a yb er e n d e r e de v e nm o r ed i ﬃcult with ﬁeld data, as they might be polluted
by other sources of noise generated by time eﬀects, variations in the values of the
exogenous variables, or players adjusting to the new environment.
As mentioned in the introduction, our results are context speciﬁc, and they
may not extend directly beyond the French Treasury experience. Indeed, Monte
Carlo simulations suggest that alternative values of the structural parameters may
yield diﬀerent conclusions. In particular, like Fevrier et al. (2002), we ﬁnd that the
discriminatory format would generate higher revenues for the Treasury than the
uniform-price auction, if bidders are risk neutral and small banks receive private
signals drawn from the same distribution as their larger counterparts. Our results,
however, appear to be robust in the context of the French Treasury auctions, since
48This increase in the variability of the Treasury revenue under the uniform-price format may
be explained by the reduction of the negative correlation between the revenues generated during
an auction by the large and small banks.
49Our simulations actually suggest that the revenue of the French Treasury would be larger
at 66.8% of the auctions in our sample, if they were conducted with the uniform pricing rule
instead of the discriminatory format.
34the conclusion holds in a neighborhood of the estimated parameters.50 Monte
Carlo simulations also indicate that similar conclusions may be obtainable under
a single source of either risk aversion or informational asymmetry. In the case of
the French Treasury auction, however, it appears that, given the estimated values
of the structural parameters, both informational and risk aversion asymmetries
are necessary.
11. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to test whether bidders in French Treasury auctions
are symmetric, and to determine which of the discriminatory or uniform-price
format is the most appropriate in this context. To address these questions, we
generalized the share auction model with supply uncertainty of Wang and Zender
(2002) to account for informational and risk aversion asymmetries. The structural
estimation of the model suggests that participants in French Treasury auctions
may be divided in two distinct groups, diﬀerentiated by their level of risk aversion,
and the quality of their information about the value of the security to be sold. A
counter-factual analysis also indicates that, under our model’s hypotheses, both
the French Treasury and the auctions’ participants would have beneﬁted, if the
auctions in our sample had been conducted under the uniform-price format instead
of the discriminatory format.
This result contrasts with a previous structural analysis conducted in France
under the symmetry and risk neutrality assumptions. Indeed, Fevrier et al. (2002)
ﬁnd that discriminatory auctions increase the revenue of the French Treasury. Fail-
ure to account for potential risk aversion and asymmetries in Treasury auctions,
therefore appears to have serious consequences, as it may, for instance, lead to
conclude in favor of the incorrect auction format.
Moreover, although speciﬁc to the French Treasury, our analysis may be con-
sidered of general interest. Indeed, just like in France, most Treasury auctions
around the world seem to involve asymmetric bidders, and are conducted with
the discriminatory format. Our results suggest that in such context, the deter-
mination of the best pricing rule crucially depends on the underlying structural
parameters of the model. The theoretic and econometric methodology developed
50More precisely, given our parameter estimates, we are able to construct the following 95%
conﬁdence intervals for the gains of the diﬀerent participants after shifting to the uniform-price
format: revenue gains by the French Treasury [2.761%,7.328%], utility gains by large banks
[2.887%,9.841%], utility gains by small banks [4.708%,8.617%].
35in the present paper could therefore be applied to other Treasury auctions to
test in each individual case which auction mechanism appears to be the most
advantageous to the auctioneer.
To conclude, it is interesting to note that the spirit of our results is some-
what consistent with the basic intuition of Friedman (1960). Indeed, Friedman
suggested that the uniform-price format was preferable as it may provide an in-
centive to small and/or uniformed bidders to participate. Although participation
is considered to be fully exogenous in our model, we ﬁnd that shifting to the
uniform-price format may incite less informed and more risk averse participants
to behave more aggressively. As it turns out, this increased competition may
beneﬁt not only the Treasury, but also the auctions’ participants.
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3913. Appendix: Identiﬁcation of the Model
To address the issue of the model’s identiﬁcation, we built on the general procedure pro-
posed by Florens and Sbaï (2002) for auction models with risk averse bidders. The proce-
dure is based on the local identiﬁcation principle. Before we deﬁne this notion more pre-
cisely, let us recall that the parameters of interest are the vectors β =( δ0,δ1,δ2,δ3,σV)
which characterizes the distribution of the true value of the security, (σ1,σ2) the vari-
ances of the bidders’ private signals, and λ =( λ1,λ2) the risk aversion parameters. Let
us also denote θ =( β,σ1,σ2).
Deﬁnition 13.1. The parameters (θ,λ) and (θ∗,λ∗) are observationally equivalent
((θ,λ) ∼ (θ∗,λ∗)) iﬀ G = G∗,w h e r eG = Fθ◦

ϕθ,λ−1








to the set of admissible strategies.
Deﬁnition 13.2. The parameters (θ,λ) ∈ R9 are locally identiﬁed iﬀ there exists a
neighborhood V(θ,λ) of (θ,λ) in R9 such that
∀ (θ∗,λ∗) ∈ V(θ,λ), (θ∗,λ∗) ∼ (θ,λ)= ⇒ (θ∗,λ∗)=( θ,λ) .
Lemma 13.3. (θ∗,λ∗) is observationally equivalent to (θ,λ) iﬀ
Fθ∗ − G ◦ ϕ
θ∗,λ∗ =0 . (13.1)
The proof is trivial: if (θ∗,λ∗) ∼ (θ,λ) then G = G∗,a n dFθ∗ = G∗ ◦ ϕθ∗,λ∗ =
G ◦ ϕθ∗,λ∗. Conversely, equation (13.1) implies G = G∗ from the deﬁnition of G∗ .
The next theorem is an adaptation of a result in Florens and Sbaï (2002) to our
model.








,w h e r eϕ
θ,λ
l is a strategy













is one to one ∀(θ,λ) ∈ R9,w h e r eFθ is the joint distribution of (s1,s 2) a pair of signals
of a representative player in each group.














,a n dG = Fθ ◦

ϕθ,λ−1
is the c.d.f. of the observed
pair of actions of a representative players of each group.
Note that A((θ,λ);(θ,λ)) = 0. It follows from the implicit function theorem that,
if the diﬀerential of A(·) w.r.t. (θ∗,λ∗) is injective at ((θ,λ);(θ,λ)), then there exists
an e i g h b o r h o o dV(θ,λ) of (θ,λ) such that (θ∗,λ∗)=( θ,λ) is the unique solution to the
equation A((θ,λ);(θ∗,λ∗)) = 0 for (θ∗,λ∗) ∈ V(θ,λ). In this case, it follows from
Lemma 13.1 that (θ,λ) is locally identiﬁed. The diﬀerential of A(·) w.r.t. (θ∗,λ∗)




















































Note that the CSEs are fully deﬁned by a parameter dl which may be expressed as
a function of (θ,λ). Therefore, ϕ
θ,λ
l , the strategy function of players in group l,m a y











Since the distributions and strategies belong to known parametric families, we can easily
derive ∂slFθ, ∂(θ,λ)Fθ and ∂slϕdl(θ,λ). The derivation of ∂(θ,λ)ϕdl(θ,λ), however is usually
not as straightforward, since dl (θ,λ) is typically an implicit function of (θ,λ).A s
suggested in Florens and Sbaï (2002), we can derive ∂(θ,λ)ϕdl(θ,λ) in this situation by
41applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the ﬁrst order conditions deﬁning the CSE.











∂d1 ˜ U1 (d1,d 2,θ,λ1)




∂d1 ˜ U1 (d1,d 2,θ,λ1)





d1 ˜ U1 (d1,d 2,θ,λ1) ∂d2∂d1 ˜ U1 (d1,d 2,θ,λ1)
∂d1∂d2 ˜ U2 (d1,d 2,θ,λ2) ∂2




∂d1 ˜ U1 (d1,d 2,θ,λ1),∂d2 ˜ U2 (d1,d 2,θ,λ2)
l
.
Since the expected utility is a known parametric function, the derivatives in the
previous expression may be calculated without diﬃculty in most practical applications.




(Average per auction unless mentioned otherwise) 
   Total  OAT  BTAN 





















































Non Competitive Bids  













































































Probability that a Small Bank is 























































Total Revenue for Treasury 







♣ Prices are expressed as a percentage of one Euro. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Number of Observations: 118        
* Indicates parameters significant at a 5% significance level.  







Structural Parameter Estimates 
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Number of Observations: 40,496 
* Indicates parameters significant at a 5% significance level.  











Quantity Supplied to Competitive Bidders  
 
Parameter 
0 α  
(Constant) 
1 α  
(MeanBracket) 
2 α  
(SpreadBracket) 
3 α  
(Maturity) 
4 α  
(Yield) 
5 α  
(Type) 
υ σ  




































0.765 Table 4 
Simulation of Discriminatory Treasury Auctions 
(Average per auction unless mentioned otherwise) 
   Total  OAT  BTAN 







































































Probability that a Small Bank is 










































































Subject to the 





































Total Revenue for Treasury 







♣ Prices are expressed as a percentage of one Euro.  Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
 Table 5 
Parameters of the CSE Bid Function 
Discriminatory Auction 
(N1=5, N2=15, other exogenous variables are taken at their means) 
 Large  Banks  Small  Banks 
d(0) 9.033E-1  4.521E-1 
d(1)  -1.133E-1 -5.534E-2 
d(2)  -1.184E-1 -1.621E-1 
d(3)  -1.204E-1 -5.087E-2 
d(4)  -8.397E-2 -5.945E-3 









Used in Estimation 
Alternative 
CSE(3) 
C1 .  9.871E-3  4.725E-6 
C2 1.656E-3  2.012E-5  8.377E-6 
C3 (in %)  5.328  0.052 0.050 
C4 2.307E-2  7.365E-5  5.952E-5 
 
Table 7 
Parameters of the CSE Bid Function 
Uniform-Price Auction 
(N1=5, N2=15, other exogenous variables are taken at their means) 
 Large  Banks  Small  Banks 
d(0) 7.300E-1  6.358E-1 
d(1)  -8.074E-2 -6.309E-2 
d(2)  -8.467E-5 -3.592E-2 
d(3)  -9.087E-2 -8.856E-2 
d(4)  -2.648E-4 -7.091E-3 









Used in Simulations 
Alternative 
CSE(3) 
C1 .  2.096E-2  1.028E-6 
C2 4.638E-4  7.826E-6  4.914-6 
C3 (in %)  6.351  0.043 0.038 
C4 6.377E-3  1.326E-5  9.794E-6  
Table 9 
Simulation of Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions 
(Average per auction unless mentioned otherwise) 
   Total  OAT  BTAN 
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Total Revenue for Treasury 












 Graph 1 : Bid Functions 























Large Firm Discriminatory Small Firm Discriminatory
Large Firm Uniform Small Firm Uniform
Graph 2  
Effect of Private Signals on Quantity Demanded by a 
Large Firm in a Discriminatory Auction
















































Average + 0.5 Standard Deviation Average + 1 Standard Deviation
Average + 2 Standard Deviation Average + 3 Standard Deviation